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PENNSYLVANIA V. UNION GAS COMPANY
THE SUPREME COURT EMPLOYS THE WRONG MEANS
TO REACH THE PROPER END
Environmental protection is a growing concern in the United States and
around the world.' This concern is evident in extensive media coverage of
environmental issues and politics. Environmental protection was a major issue in
the 1988 Presidential campaign. 2 Recognizing the need for environmental legisla-
tion, Congress enacted The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA).3 CERCLA's primary purpose is to
provide a comprehensive approach to remedying hazardous waste problems. The
Act does so by providing enforcement authority and funding for hazardous waste
clean-ups.4
Unlike pollution, the eleventh amendment is not a growing concern of the
public. It is not a fixture in the news, nor was it a vital component in President Bush's
campaign. Judicial interpretation of the eleventh amendment will not have the direct
impact on the lives of future generations that the environment will. However, in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,' the United States Supreme Court's interpretation
of the eleventh amendment was instrumental in determining the future scope and ef-
fectiveness of CERCLA.6
In Union Gas, a third-party plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court against
the State of Pennsylvania.7 The complaint alleged that Pennsylvania was liable,
under the provisions of CERCLA, for the cost of cleaning-up a hazardous waste site.8
The state raised the eleventh amendment as a bar to the suit.9 This was the first case
I Martz, The Green Summit, NEWSWEEK, July 24, 1989, at 12. The heads of state of the world's seven most
productive industrial nations gathered in Paris, France in July, 1989. The meeting was planned as a forum
for foreign policy and economic discussion. However, it turned into a "green summit" as the leaders'
primary focus turned towards environmental issues. For the first time the environment had center stage at
a world-powers summit.
2 Chappie, Environmental Protection in 1989: Can Bush, Congress Move Legislation On Clean Air, Waste
Issues?, 19 ENV'T REP. 1883 (1989). President Bush included environmental issues in his campaign. He
supported control of acid rain, the Clean Air Act, elimination of ocean dumping, and he went to Boston Harbor
to publicize the pollution in Governor Dukakis' home state.
3 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1982).4 H.R. Rep. No. 1016,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, pt. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119,
6125.
5 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
6 J. ARBUCKLE, N. BRYSON, D. CASE, C. CHERNEY, R. HALL, J. MARTIN, J. MILLER, M. MILLER, W. PEDERSEN,
R. RANDLE, R. STOLL, T. SULLIVAN, T. VANDERVER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 101 (9th ed. 1987).
Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277.
1 Id.
9 The eleventh amendment states:
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
531
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in which the Supreme Court addressed whether Congress can enact legislation under
its commerce power which effectively abrogates the states' eleventh amendment im-
munity. 10 In analyzing this issue, the Supreme Court examined its previous
decisions," the holding of each Court of Appeals to decide this issue, 12 the purposes
of CERCLA, 13 and the balance of power between state and federal government.
14
The Union Gas opinion follows a line of Supreme Court cases which make
exceptions to the eleventh amendment's grant of state immunity.I5 The exception in
Union Gas; that Congress may abrogate eleventh amendment immunity under its
commerce power, enables the federal government to provide a comprehensive so-
lution to hazardous waste problems. 16 This casenote reviews the facts of Union Gas,
the history of eleventh amendment jurisprudence, and the purposes of CERCLA.
The note critically analyzes the Supreme Court's approach to evading eleventh
amendment immunity. Finally, the note contemplates the impact of Union Gas on
CERCLA and eleventh amendment law.
FACTS
Substantive Facts
Predecessors of Union Gas owned and operated a carburetted water gas plant
near Brodhead Creek in Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania.' 7 The plant operated from 1890
through 1948 and produced coal tar as a by-product of the gas processing. 8 Union
Gas and its predecessors allegedly deposited the coal tar in the ground near Brodhead
Creek. 19 From 1953 to 1970, Union Gas sold portions of the land near Brodhead
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens
or subjects of a Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277.
0 oUnion Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2281. The Supreme Court has interpreted the eleventh amendment as a broad grant
of sovereign immunity to the states, prohibiting federal jurisdiction in cases where citizens sue states for
money damages in federal court. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
" Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2281. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S.
279 (1973).
12 Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2281. See, e.g., United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987);
In re McKvey Trucking Inc., 812 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987).
'3 Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2285. Congress intended CERCLA as a sweeping remedy to hazardous waste
problems.
14 Id.
'I ld. at 2281. See cases cited supra note 11. See also Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highway and Pub. Transp.,
483 U.S. 468 (1987).
6 Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2285.
17 United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d 372,374 (3d Cir. 1986), vacated, 479 U.S. 1025, rev'd. 832 F.2d
1343 (1987).
18Id
,
1" Id. at 375.
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Creek to Pennsylvania Power and Light Company. 20 The Borough of Stroudsburg
subsequently acquired easements to this land.21 Stroudsburg assigned these ease-
ments to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in early 1980.22
On October 7, 1980, Pennsylvania struck a coal tar deposit while excavating
at the creek to control flooding. 23 The coal tar released into Brodhead Creek.24 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) learned of the situation and deemed the
coal tar a hazardous substance. 2 The EPA declared Brodhead Creek the first Super-
fund 26 site in the United States and ordered a clean-up. 27 Pennsylvania and the
federal government combined forces and expurgated the site.28 The federal govern-
ment reimbursed the state for clean-up costs in the amount of $720.00.29
Procedural Facts
The United States filed suit against Union Gas in the District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.30 The complaint alleged that Union Gas was liable,
under the provisions of CERCLA, for $450,000 of the clean-up costs.3 Union Gas
denied all liability in their answer and filed a third-party complaint, pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 14,32 against Pennsylvania.33 Union Gas claimed that Pennsylvania was
liable for a share of the clean-up costs because it was an owner and operator of the
site within the meaning of CERCLA.34
Pennsylvania moved to dismiss their joinder as a third-party defendant on the
ground that the eleventh amendment barred the suit.35 Pennsylvania asserted that the
Supreme Court's opinion in Hans v. Louisiana36 made it clear that the eleventh
amendment precludes federal court jurisdiction when a private citizen brings a suit
20 Id. at 374.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. at 2276.
241d.
5 Id.
26 Id. Superfund is a popular synonym for CERCLA because the statute's clean-up funds are derived from
a tax on chemical manufacturers. See Easterbrook, Cleaning Up, NEWSWEEK, July 24, 1989, at 27, 37.
27 Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2276.
28 Id.
29 1d.
30 Id. at 2277.
31 Id.
32 FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides that a defending party, as third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and
complaint to be delivered upon a non-party who is or may be liable for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
the defending party.
31 Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2277.
4 Id.
35 Id.
36 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In Hans, the Supreme Court held that the eleventh amendment
precluded both party-based and subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts when a citizen sued a state for
money damages.
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for money damages against a state.37 The district court scrutinized CERCLA's
language and legislative history and determined that Congress did not clearly
express its intent to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity in enacting CERCLA.
38
Consequently, the court dismissed Union Gas' third-party complaint. Finding no
clear intent to abrogate, the court did not have to decide if Congress has the power
to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity when legislating pursuant to its com-
merce clause powers.
39
The United States amended its complaint, revising damage figures, and Union
gas amended its third-party complaint."0 Again, the district court dismissed Union
Gas' third-party complaint on the original grounds.4 Five months later, the United
States and Union Gas reached a settlement and the district court dismissed the case
between them.4 2
Union Gas appealed the dismissal of the third-party complaint to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.4 3 A two member majority of that court
affirmed the district court's order." The court noted that state waiver of immunity
and clear legislative intent to abrogate are the only methods of evading a state's
eleventh amendment immunity to suit in federal court. 45 The Court of Appeals
agreed with the district court's holding that Congress did not effectively abrogate
immunity under CERCLA.46
Union Gas petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a Writ of Certio-
rari. 47 While the petition was pending, Congress amended CERCLA with the Super-
fund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA).4 8 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari, vacated the Third Circuit's opinion, and remanded for further
consideration in light of SARA.49 On remand, the Third Circuit held that CERCLA's
amended language contains the clear intent of Congress required to abrogate the
eleventh amendment immunity protecting Pennsylvania from federal court jurisdic-
tion.50 The court concluded that Congress can enact legislation under its Commerce
37 United States v. Union Gas Co., 792 F.2d at 375.
38 United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. 949, 953 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
39 Id.
'o Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 375.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 373. (A. Leon Higginbothan, J., dissented and filed an opinion. Id. at 383.) J. Higginbotham opined
that CERCLA expressed Congress' clear intent that states could be liable and that Congress' plain language
should not be discarded absent legislative history suggesting the language has an alternative meaning.
41 Id. at 376. The eleventh amendment protects states from suit in federal court unless the state waives
immunity and consents to suit or Congress abrogates immunity with clear, unequivocal language.
4See id. at 374.
" Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct at 2277.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:3
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 23 [1990], Iss. 3, Art. 9
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol23/iss3/9
Spring, 1990] WRONG MEANS To REACH PROPER END 535
Clause powers which overrides a state's eleventh amendment immunity."
Pennsylvania petitioned the Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari. The
Supreme Court granted the Writ and affirmed the Third Circuit.52 The court
explained that the federal government is often the only body capable of providing
solutions to environmental problems, and these solutions must contain a cause of
action for money damages against states to be effective.
53
BACKGROUND
The Eleventh Amendment
The eleventh amendment states that:
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of
a Foreign State. 4
In his concurring opinion in Union Gas, Justice Stevens emphasized the ex-
istence of two eleventh amendments.5 5 First, there is the literal and proper meaning
of the amendment.5 6 Proponents of this view claim the amendment's language and
history are so clear that it can only be interpreted as a bar to suits against states where
federal jurisdiction is party based. Second, there exists a judicially expanded
version of the eleventh amendment which confers broad sovereign immunity upon
the states.58 The "second eleventh amendment" arose from the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Hans v. Louisiana.5 9 In Hans, the Supreme Court departed from the amend-
ment's plain language and extended eleventh amendment immunity to preclude suits
against states in which federal jurisdiction was premised on subject matter.60
I. The First Eleventh Amendment
The Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia6' planted the seed from
51 Id.
52 Id.
11 Id. at 2285.
14 U.S. CON T. amend. X1.
11 Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286 (Stevens, J., concurring).
56 id.
51 See Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989); Jackson,
The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L. J. 1(1988); Gibbons,
The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889
(1983).
5s Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2286.
59 134 U.S. 1 (1890)
6 Id.
62 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419 (1793).
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which the eleventh amendment grew.62 In Chisholm, the Supreme Court exercised
original jurisdiction in an action in assumpsit. A South Carolina citizen brought suit
against the State of Georgia.6 3 The Supreme Court interpreted Article III's grant of
party-based jurisdiction literally and rejected the view that the clause pertained only
to suits in which the state was a plaintiff.64
The states radically opposed Chisholm, fearing liability in federal courts for
revolutionary war debts.65 Under state law, most states were immune to a cause of
action for debt recovery. 66 However, the Chisholm doctrine employed Article III's
party-based jurisdiction as a federal limitation on state immunity laws. 67 Even if
state law rendered a state immune from a cause of action for debt recovery in state
court, Chisholm allowed federal courts to entertain state law claims against a state
if jurisdiction was based on the state-citizen or state-alien diversity clauses of Article
111.68 Thus, a plaintiff could use Article III party-based jurisdiction to circumvent
state law immunity and recover war debts from a state in federal court. 69 In response
to the states' opposition of Chisholm, Congress proposed and the states ratified the
eleventh amendment.10
A. Pre-Hans Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence
On its face, the eleventh amendment is unambiguous and seems to dictate that
states are immune only from suits brought in federal court which are premised on
party-status jurisdiction. From ratification through the Civil War, the Supreme
Court construed the amendment within the narrow parameters of its language.7
Congress did not empower the federal courts with original federal question jurisdic-
tion until 1875,72 but the Pre-Civil War Supreme Court had several opportunities to
decide federal question cases against states on direct appeal, as well as admiralty
cases against states.73 These decisions reflect the Supreme Court's understanding
that the eleventh amendment's grant of state immunity was limited to state-citizen
and state-alien diversity cases.74
62Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities In Litigation, Taxation, andRequlation: Separation of Powers Issues
in Controversies about Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV. 682, 683-84 (1976).
63 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (DalI.) 419.
Article III of the United States Constitution grants federal courts the power to hear "controversies between
a State and Citizens of another State." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; See Id.
65 Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 5 Hous. L. REV. , 7, 9, 16 (1967).
6 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 262 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67 Id.
61 Id.
69 Id.
70 Lee, Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, The Uses of History, 18 URB. LAW. 519,524 (1986).
7' Gibbons, supra note 57, at 1941.
72 The Judiciary Act of 1801 did grant federal question jurisdiction to the federal circuit courts, but the act
was repealed in 1802. See id. at 1946.
71 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 290.
74 Id.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:3
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Cohens v. Virginia75 was the first case in which a state asserted the eleventh
amendment as a defense.76 In Cohens, the Supreme Court held that the eleventh
amendment did not apply because the case involved a writ of error in a criminal
proceeding." The court reasoned that a criminal defendant's petition for writ of error
is not within the eleventh amendment's scope of suits "commenced or prosecuted"
against a state.78 However, in dictum, Justice Marshall stated that if the eleventh
amendment did apply it would not prohibit a suit against a state in which federal
jurisdiction was premised on subject matter.79 In Osborn v. Bank of the United
States,8" the eleventh amendment did not bar a private citizen's suit because the state
was not a party of record, even though recovery was sought from state funds.8 This
decision did not limit eleventh amendment immunity on Article III grounds, but it
does indicate the narrow stance the Supreme Court took in construing the scope of
the amendment.82
The Supreme Court's reluctance to extend eleventh amendment state immu-
nity to admiralty cases further illustrates its literal interpretation of the eleventh
amendment. In United States v. Peters," Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,
found that the eleventh amendment did not bar a citizen's admiralty suit against a
state official for recovery of funds also claimed by the Commonwealth of Pennsyl-
vania.85 In United States v. Bright,86 Justice Bushrod Washington87 noted that the
eleventh amendment expressly applies to suits in "law or equity," but does not
mention suits in admiralty.
88
At no time prior to 189089 did the Supreme Court offer an expansive reading
of the eleventh amendment.90 During this period, the court had numerous opportu-
nities9' to extend eleventh amendment immunity beyond the dictate of the amend-
" 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
76 Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation ofthe Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction, 35 STAN. L. REV.
1033, 1084-87 (1983).
17 See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264.
78 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 295.
79 See Id. at 296.
80 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
81 Id. at 857.
82 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 298.
83 See cases cited infra notes 84-88.
8 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
87 Id. at 139.
'6 24 Fed. Cas. 1232 (D. Pa. 1809).
87 Justice Washington sat on the Marshall Court when it decided Peters.
8 Bright, 24 Fed. Cas. at 1236.
89 1890 is the year the Supreme Court construed the eleventh amendment as a bar to all suits against states
(federal questions and admiralty as well as diversity) in Hans v. Louisiana.
90 Gibbons, supra note 57, at 1968.
91 In cases like Osborn, Cohens, and Peters the court could have read the eleventh amendment to preclude
suits against state officials and suits arising under federal questions or admiralty. See also Exparte Madrazzo,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 627 (1833).
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ment's plain language. 92 Despite the opportunity, the court never interpreted the
amendment to preclude suits premised on federal questions or admiralty, nor did the
court expand the amendment to protect state officials.93 The pre-1890 opinions
concerning the eleventh amendment are not free of ambiguity and they do not
expressly state that the amendment pertains solely to party-based claims against a
state.94 Nevertheless, these opinions show that the court understood that eleventh
amendment immunity extends no further than the confines of the amendment's plain
language. 95
The Second Eleventh Amendment
The judicially expanded version of the eleventh amendment 96 is rooted in the
1890 case of Hans v. Louisiana.97 In Hans, a Louisiana citizen sued his own state
to receive payment on a state-issued bond.98 Hans sought federal jurisdiction
pursuant to Article III's "arising under" clause.99 Departing from its stance in
Cohens and Peters, the Supreme Court stretched the scope of the eleventh amend-
ment beyond its plain language." The court held that the amendment precluded
federal courts from hearing suits brought by private citizens against states even when
jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to a federal question. 0 '
Post-Hans Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence
Hans is conventionally viewed as a judicial enlargement of eleventh amend-
ment immunity. ' 2 This view has influenced the adjudication of post- Hans eleventh
amendment cases.103 The Supreme Court has not focused on the letter of the amend-
ment, but on Hans' principle of broad sovereign immunity. In many situations, the
doctrine of pure sovereign immunity is incompatible with policy needs and our
federal system of government. 104 As a result, the Supreme Court made exceptions
92 Gibbons, supra note 57, at 1968.
93 Id.
94 Fletcher, supra note 76, at 1087.
95/d.
96 The judicially expanded eleventh amendment precluded federal courts from hearing any suit against states
brought by citizens seeking money damages. The language of the amendment indicates that only diversity
suits against states are prohibited. Thus, applying the amendment to federal question suits, as the court did
in Hans, is an expansion of state immunity.
97 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
98 Id. at 1.
99 Hans' action was based on the Contracts Clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Thus, it was
a federal question, not diversity case.
" See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. at 10, 11. The court noted that interpreting the eleventh amendment to
bar diverse citizens from suing a state, but allowing a citizen to sue his own state under federal law, would
be as. startling and unexpected as was the courts decision in Chisholm.
,01 Id. at 13.
02 Exparte New York, 256 U.S. 490,497 (1921); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,322-
32 (1934).
'
3 See cases cited supra note 11. See also, Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highway & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468
(1987).
" Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. at 497; See also Id.
[Vol. 23:3AKRON LAW REVIEW
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when necessary to escape the effect of Hans.'05
Despite the multitude ofjudicial exceptions to eleventh amendment sovereign
immunity, Hans is still good law. This is evident from the Supreme Court's decision
in Edelman v. Jordan. 106 Edelman limited an exception to state immunity previously
created in Exparte Young. 107 In Exparte Young, the eleventh amendment did not bar
a private individual's suit against a state official for misconduct in his official
capacity.'0 8 Edelman limited the Young exception by holding that a suit instituted
under the Young exception applies only towards prospective grants of relief.' °
Edelman shows that the eleventh amendment, as interpreted in Hans, bars certain
federal question causes of action against states in federal court.
ANALYSIS
The Decision
There were three issues before the Supreme Court in Union Gas:
1. Does CERCLA express Congress' clear intent to subject states to suits in
federal court?
2. Can Congress enact legislation under its Commerce Clause powers which
effectively abrogates the states' eleventh amendment sovereign immunity?
3. Should Hans v. Louisiana be overturned on the ground that the eleventh
amendment is not a broad constitutional grant of sovereign immunity?
The Court considered these issues in the above order. After holding that Congress
intended CERCLA to permit suits for money damages against states,"0 the Court
concluded that the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to abrogate elev-
enth amendment immunity."' The resolution of the first two issues made the legiti-
macy of Hans moot because the decision already favored Union Gas." 2 Thus, the
105 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445. (Congress may abrogate eleventh amendment immunity when
legislating under the fourteenth amendment, sec. 5); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (The eleventh
amendment does not bar suits against state officials); Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Pub. Health & Welfare,
411 U.S. 279. (A state may waive its immunity, subjecting itself to suit in federal court.)
l 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
I7 ld. at 663-71.
00 See Young, 209 U.S. at 167.
109 See Edelman, 415 U.S. 651. See also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985); Pennhurst State School
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104-106 (1984). Young is distinguished from these cases because Young
rests on the vindication of federal rights, while Edelman balances federal rights against the competing interest
of the constitutional immunity of the states.
110 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. at 2280-81.
III Id. at 2286.
112 Id.
Spring, 1990]
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Union Gas opinion adds another exception to the existing pile which permit citizens
to sue states for money damages in federal court.
Congress' Clear Intent
The Supreme Court has stated that Congress can abrogate state immunity, but
it must express its intention to abrogate in unmistakable language." 3 In Union Gas,
the court examined CERCLA's language, as amended by SARA, and determined
that Congress effectively abrogated state immunity." 4 CERCLA includes "per-
sons" and "owners or operators" as those potentially liable for clean-up costs. "5
States are expressly incorporated in the definition of "persons." 116 "Owners or
operators" are persons, within the meaning of CERCLA, who undertake certain
hazardous waste related activities." 7 Under SARA,' 8 a state is excluded from the
category of "owners or operators" if the state acquired ownership or control of the
waste site involuntarily. 19 However, SARA further explains that states which
voluntarily acquire control are subject to liability to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity. 2o
The Supreme Court held that the express inclusion of states under CERCLA's
liability section and SARA's provision protecting states from liability when invol-
untarily acquiring control illustrate Congress' clear intent to subject states to
CERCLA liability.' 2' The court reasoned that Congress would not need to protect
states from liability when the state involuntarily acquired the property unless
Congress had abrogated eleventh amendment immunity elsewhere in the statute. 2
Congress' Commerce Clause Powers
Union Gas was the first case in which the Supreme Court held that congress
could abrogate eleventh amendment immunity when acting pursuant to its com-
merce powers. 23 The court noted that each Circuit Court to address this issue
concluded that the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to abrogate state
'3 Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highway & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. at 475-76 (The court assumed that Congress
could abrogate under its commerce powers, but decided the case on a waiver theory). See Green v. Mansour,
474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of power, can abrogate if it unequivocally
expresses its intent to do so).
"4 See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2282.
'1 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1980).
116 Id. § 9601(21) (1980).
7 Id. § 9601(20)(a) (1980).
,, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
19 See id.
120 See id.
2I Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. at 2278.
122 Id.
,
23 Id. at 2281. The court had twice assumed that the Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to abrogate,
but Union Gas was the first case it directly addressed the issue. See Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highway & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. at 475-76; County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 252 (1985).
[Vol. 23:3
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immunity. '24 The Supreme Court found that its previous decisions support Congres-
sional abrogation of state immunity. '25 In Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama
Docks Department,'2 6 the court noted that the states relinquished a portion of their
sovereignty when they ratified the Constitution and the Constitution grants Congress
the right to regulate commerce. 27 In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,12s Congress was able to
abrogate eleventh amendment immunity when legislating under §5 of the fourteenth
amendment. 29 These cases emphasize Congress' general ability to subject states to
suits for money damages in federal court and lay a firm foundation for the decision
in Union Gas.30
In the Union Gas opinion, Justice Brennan quoted from Exparte Virginia'3'
to emphasize the post Civil War shift in federal-state power. In Ex parte Virginia,
the Court held that judicial enforcement of the prohibitions of the fourteenth
amendment is not an encroachment on state sovereign immunity. 32 The court stated
that:
No law can be [an invasion of state immunity], which the people of the
States have, by the Constitution of the United States, empowered Con-
gress to enact.... [I]n exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the
limitations which the Federal Constitution has applied to her power.
Her rights do not reach that extent.'33
The Union Gas opinion harmonized this quote regarding Congress' fourteenth
amendment powers with Congress' power to abrogate eleventh amendment immu-
nity when acting under its commerce powers. 3 4 Both are express Constitutional
grants of authority. 3 5 Both grants are plenary and expand federal power while
diminishing state rights. 3 6 Thus, the reasoning in Ex parte Virginia applies to the
Commerce Clause as well as the fourteenth amendment.'3 7 A state's sovereign
immunity is not invaded when Congress exercises Constitutionally granted powers,
even if such exercise interferes with rights the state enjoyed before Congress
obtained this power. '
124 Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2281.
125 Id.
126 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
27 Id. at 191. However, Parden was decided on a waiver theory and not on Commerce Clause abrogation.
128 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
129 See id. See also Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
13 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. at 2282.
131 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
132 Id. at 346.
133 Id.
114 Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2282.
135 Id.
136id.
137 Id.
13 Id. at 2282-83.
11
Brodman: Wrong Means To Reach Proper End
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1990
This Ex parte Virginia reasoning indicates the Court's understanding that
there is no conflict between a state's eleventh amendment immunity and Congress'
power to abrogate via Commerce Clause legislation. The states gave Congress the
power to regulate commerce when they ratified the Constitution. This grant of
Constitutional power to Congress caused a corresponding diminution of state
rights. 139 The states relinquished their eleventh amendment immunity in causes of
action arising under Commerce Clause legislation which clearly expresses Con-
gress' intent to abrogate. Immunity from such causes of action would violate the Ex
parte Virginia doctrine because a state would be exercising her right to immunity
while disregarding the valid Constitutional limitations which Congress applied to
those rights.' 4° The Supreme Court further explained that the language of the
eleventh amendment endorses this reasoning.' 4 ' The amendment expressly limits
the extent of federal judicial power.' However, it does not limit the power which
the Constitution confers upon Congress. 143 Thus, the eleventh amendment does not
preclude Congressional abrogation of state eleventh amendment immunity when
Congress acts pursuant to a Constitutional grant of power,
Cercla And Union Gas
Congress' Article I abrogation power is the legal theory upon which the Su-
preme Court decided Union Gas, but the decision also serves a valid policy interest.
Union Gas illustrates the Supreme Court's support of environmental legislation.
The decision will have a positive effect on the country's hazardous waste problem.44
The American public will view these points as the significant thrust of Union Gas.'41
Consequently, society will view the decision favorably.
The Court stressed that the federal government must supply the answers to
environmental problems. 46 State law is often incapable of remedying environ-
mental harm. 147 State law regarding the environment tends to intrude on the rights
of other states and their municipalities. 48 The environment does not stop at the
border of any particular state. State A may pollute its own waterways, but the
pollution is likely to run into State B. Each state may have different environmental
laws. In Union Gas, the Supreme Court recognized that uniformity is the most
efficient method of environmental legislation. 49 Any entity violating a statute must
139 Id. at 2282.
140 Id. at 2283.
141 Id.
14 2 Id.
143 Id.
'4 See Supreme Court Holds States May Be Liable, 20 ENV'T REP. 460 (1989).
'41 Cleaning Up, supra note 26. The public is vastly in favor of environmental protection. Society perceives
environmental problems as fundamentally disgraceful.
' Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2285.
141 Id. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
148 See, e.g., id.
'49 Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2285.
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be liable for money damages to create effective legislation. 150 Previous legislative
attempts at environmental protection failed because they focused on prevention, not
monetary compensation.' 5' Union Gas commands that all responsible parties pay
monetary damages under CERCLA.
The application of CERCLA liability to the states affords the statute a clear
opportunity to attain its goals. CERCLA's main objectives are to prevent hazardous
waste contamination and provide incentive for voluntary clean-up when a spill does
occur. 52 States own or operate a large number of waste sites. 5 3 Absent a cause of
action for money damages, there is less incentive for a state to voluntarily participate
in waste clean-ups. 54 Potential CERCLA liability will motivate states to voluntarily
expunge all contamination sites. Additionally, if states clean their sites quickly, their
potential liability is limited. 55
In light of Union Gas, states will be more prudent in spending Superfund
money. 56 In the past, states would overspend when involved in waste clean-ups
because they were spending Superfund money and realized that the eleventh amend-
ment prevented the use of state funds. 57 States will actively oversee clean-up expen-
ditures if they know that state funds are subject to use. 58 Furthermore, potential state
liability will benefit clean-up and settlement negotiations. 5 9 States will no longer
use immunity as a bargaining chip.I' ° When a state bargains with a private entity to
apportion Superfund liability or to arrange a clean-up procedure, the state must
bargain in good faith. Before Union Gas, a state could walk away from negotiations
knowing there was no monetary risk. 161 States did not have to bargain with private
entities at arms length. Now states will feel pressure to reach settlements. Potential
state liability will foster fair settlements and speedy clean-up arrangements. 62
The Dichotomy Of Hans v. Louisiana
While the practical effect of Union Gas will be applauded, the Court should
150 id.
151 Id. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 90 Stat. 2796, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657
(1976).52 H.R. Rep. No. 96-1016,96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119,
6120.
153 States own or operate 16% of waste sites nationwide. EPA Office of Emergency Response, estimate July
1, 1988.
15 Supreme Court Holds States May Be Liable, supra note 145, at 460.
155 Id.
1
56
1d.
117 Id. For example, at the Brodhead Creek site, contractors were charging EPA workers $16 a day for the
use of a shovel.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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have caused that effect by overturning Hans. The court could have overturned Hans
and achieved the same environmental policy results without ever deciding if
Congress can abrogate immunity under its commerce powers. Overturning Hans
would limit eleventh amendment immunity to diversity cases.163 A state could not
cry immunity when a cause of action against it arose under federal law. Pennsylvania
could not have raised the eleventh amendment as a defense to Union Gas' federal law
claim. Overturning Hans would cleanse the murky waters surrounding eleventh
amendment law. Furthermore, destroying the Hans fiction would be in accordance
with the history and letter of the eleventh amendment. 
64
Eleventh amendment case law is confusing. Hans, the starting point for
modem eleventh amendment law, has numerous exceptions. The exceptions are
designed to avoid the constricting effect of the Hans decision. 65 Add further
exceptions which limit or expand the original exceptions and it is difficult to
determine when a private party can sue a state for money damages in federal court. 1
66
Limiting eleventh amendment immunity to diversity cases would untangle the
complex web of eleventh amendment law.
If Hans was correctly decided, then many of the Supreme Court's eleventh
amendment decisions are erroneous. The eleventh amendment speaks of judicial
power. In an actual eleventh amendment case, the question is whether the federal
court has the power to hear the case. 167 In Clark v. Barnard,161 the Supreme Court
held that a state may waive immunity and consent to suit in federal court.
16 9
However, it is well settled that a party may not waive a defect in subject matter
jurisdiction. 170 This is especially true where a federal court does not have Article III
jurisdiction. 171 If Hans was correct, then the eleventh amendment bars federal
jurisdiction where a state is the defendant and a private citizen brings suit to recover
money damages based on a federal question. In this situation, the federal courts have
no jurisdiction and a waiver of state immunity does not invoke subject matter
jurisdiction. 172
The Edelman case further illustrates that Hans' extension of eleventh amend-
ment immunity to prohibit federal question cases is a judicial fiction. In Edelman,
federal jurisdiction was found to exist, but only towards prospective relief. 173 Either
63 See supra note 56.
14 See supra notes 74-87.
165 See supra note 11.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651.
167 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 109 S. Ct. at 2286-87 (Stevens, J., concurring).
168 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
169 Id. at 447-48.
171 Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2287 (Stevens, J., concurring). See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger,
437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978).
171 Id.
172 See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(2).
17' Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 651.
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Article III grants jurisdiction or it does not. It says nothing about jurisdiction to
render prospective relief, but not other forms of relief.7 4 These decisions are
premised on a balance of federal-state power and not on the eleventh amendment.
They cannot be based on the eleventh amendment because they do not concern the
extent of federal judicial power. 175
History validates the conclusion that the eleventh amendment was not in-
tended to apply to federal question cases. The impetus for the amendment, Chisholm
v. Georgia,17 6 was a diversity case. The text of the amendment is clear and applies
only to suits brought against a state by a citizen of another state. 177 There is no
mention of immunity from suits arising under federal law.
The early eleventh amendment case law indicates that states did not even
consider the eleventh amendment as a possible bar to suits arising under federal law.
In three cases between 18 10 and 1819, states, as defendants in civil suits, did not raise
the amendment as a defense. 178 In Cohens v. Virginia, 79 Chief Justice Marshall
stated that a state cannot be sued without its consent, but consent is not needed on
a case-by-case basis.180 States surrendered certain rights when they ratified the
Constitution, notably those rights which the Constitution gives to the federal govern-
ment.1 8 Marshall noted that Article III of the Constitution grants the federal courts
the power to hear all cases arising under the laws of the United States, and Article
III does not preclude federal jurisdiction when a state is the defendant. 82 The
Justices on the Marshall Court lived through the ratification of the Constitution, the
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,'83 and the ratification of the eleventh amendment.
The Cohens opinion and other Marshall Court eleventh amendment decisions, in all
of which the Court declined to expand eleventh amendment immunity beyond
diversity cases, should receive particular attention in analyzing the scope of eleventh
amendment state immunity.8 4 In Union Gas, the court should have overturned Hans
v. Louisiana. Early eleventh amendment jurisprudence, the text of the amendment,
and the incompatibility of Hans with Article III jurisdiction support this view.
CONCLUSION
The environment will benefit from Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. The threat
14 See Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. at 2287 (Stevens, J., concurring).
175 Id.
176 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419 (1793).
"n U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
'
78 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.)
164 (1812); Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 286 (1810).
179 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
1s0 Id. at 380.
'1 id.
1M2 Id. at 382-83.
183 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419 (1793).
'1 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 290-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of CERCLA liability will cause states to be more responsible in handling waste sites
within their control. States will act with greater efficiency in cleaning sites where
spills occur. If CERCLA is to be effective, Superfund money must be spent
prudently. The threat of liability will make a state think twice before renting a shovel
for $16 a day. To an extent CERCLA's effectiveness depends on the strength which
Congress gave it. However, the Courts holding in Union Gas provides CERCLA an
opportunity to reach its goals.
The Court could have bestowed the same benefit upon the environment by
reversing Hans as it did by creating another exception to Hans. The text of the
eleventh amendment and the way its framers interpreted it indicate that it precludes
only diversity-based cases against states in federal court. The post-Hans exceptions
are confusing. The eleventh amendment speaks in terms limiting federal jurisdic-
tion, but the post-Hans exceptions are based on federal-state balance of power. If the
eleventh amendment is truly a bar to federal question jurisdiction over states, then
concerns over balance of power should not effect the jurisdictional bar. The
evidence weighs in favor of reversing Hans.
Why did the Court choose to avoid the Hans issue? Stare decisis is one
plausible answer. It is possible that the Court did not want to disrupt its previous
eleventh amendment rulings. It is also possible that the Court is slowly invalidating
Hans. With each exception to eleventh amendment immunity the Hans doctrine
offers less protection to the states. By making exceptions to eleventh amendment
immunity the Court can reach the proper result in the case before it without seriously
disturbing the balance of power between state and federal government.
Despite any valid concern for stare decisis or the balance of governmental
power the Court should have overturned Hans. In overturning Hans the Court would
have changed the confusing state of eleventh amendment law. Litigants would know
the circumstances in which a state is subject to federal jurisdiction. The force of the
eleventh amendment would be in accord with its language and its framers' intent.
The balance of state-federal power would be as the framers envisioned it. The
Supreme Court would not have to make exceptions which are unjustifiable. In Union
Gas, the Supreme Court arrived at the correct conclusion regarding the environment,
but took a wrong turn in getting there.
CHRISTOPHER A. BRODMAN
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